The Long Game, Part 1

I have been an Apple developer by profession since 1996; my start in the ecosystem was during a time of immense challenge to Apple and the 3rd party developers supporting the company. At that time, it wasn't clear that there would even *be* an Apple for very long.

I entered the field working for DataViz, which at the time had a bundling agreement for MacLinkPlus/Easy Open Translators to be included with every copy of MacOS shipped. Our software enabled Mac users to translate file formats (Word to ClarisWorks, Lotus 123 to Excel, etc.), which was a necessity given the broad variety of productivity software available in this time frame. The bundling was greatly beneficial to DataViz, as we could capture registrations (leading to direct upgrade sales) from a large segment of the Apple ecosystem, driving our “Pro” version development and greater product expansion.

Beside the revenue, DataViz had executive-level access to Apple - regular discussions with WWDR staff, DTS help as needed, seed hardware, access to whatever we needed at WWDC, and so on. The relationship was fruitful. We were Apple developers in an era of close and long-standing professional relationships, stretching the limits of the platform, and building software which kept Apple relevant against Windows and Microsoft Office. As someone just starting their career, it was a dream come true. As an junior engineer in love with Apple technologies, it was a challenge to balance the enthusiasm for the environment with the recognition of the headwinds Apple was facing.

Apple’s challenges in keeping “classic” MacOS technically and commercially viable in the mid to late 1990s is well known. The return of Steve Jobs, the transition to PowerPC, hardware licensing, and the Microsoft’s infusion of cash were all vital parts of keeping MacOS alive enough to drive hardware sales through the Performa era. The introduction and great success of the iMac pushed the limits of MacOS 9, however. It worked - and saved MacOS, but there was no juice left to move forward with something greater.

The rumblings of a replacement operating system, and research towards one, had been ever-present. Copeland, and OpenDoc technologies, was driven to its ultimate end by Apple (and others); beOS had been available on the BeBox hardware and then released for installation on PowerPC Macs; Windows NT ran on RISC architectures (including PowerPC). I had beOS running on my Performa at work - more than experiment, far less than fully-featured, it looked like it could be workable - and it was completely modern, fast, and flexible enough to support Apple in the market.

Early 1997 was the pivotal mark in this transition. I had just returned from my first MacWorld San Francisco, where talk of change was high, Power Computing was building amazing Mac clones, and the Apple software ecosystem was pushing hard for a lifeline from Apple - hope that the platform would be reinvigorated. Although many thought beOS would be the next step, Apple had announced in late December of 1996 that it would be acquiring NeXT, and closed the deal in early February 1997.

Looking back on the press from that time, and watching the MWSF Keynote, I am struck by just how unsettling this all was. We were excited, for sure, but nothing was guaranteed - and we still had to build for MacOS for the foreseeable future.

This was a _long_ time ago. I did not yet realize that I was playing *the long game*.